**Summer Institute in Communication & Governance Reform**

**May 28 – June 7, 2013**

**Communication and Governance - Quotes**

**Simon Bunse and Verena Fritz (August, 2012). Making Public Sector Reforms Work: Political and Economic Contexts, Incentives, and Strategies. *Policy Research Working Paper 6174*. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.**

“… in unfavorable reform contexts, monitoring and fostering support from key political leaders and among veto players is crucial, if challenging. In this context, a clearer understanding of the role and importance of citizen demand for public sector reforms and how to promote it more effectively would be useful. So far, the literature offers little conclusive guidance on this issue” (p. 6)

“… In the literature on public sector reform specifically, five factors are recurrent themes: (i) the fact that public sector reforms combine significant short term costs with only long-term prospects for meaningful gains which makes it unattractive for many governments to make the initial investment (*time horizons*); (ii) the degree of *clientelism* that connects the political level and the public administration and the extent to which the public sector (and specific sub-areas) serve purposes of rent-seeking and the maintenance of clientelist networks (related to the presence of limited access orders); (iii) *resistance to change* or bureaucratic inertia and status quo bias at the level of the bureaucracy; (iv) frequently *limited demand for reforms* due to a limited development of civil society and of an entrepreneurial class separate from the state; (v) and *specific institutional incentives of political decision-makers* stemming from electoral and party systems as well as political regimes which can make it more or less feasible to initiate public sector reforms. … significant improvements in the functional capacity of the state take 10 to 20 years. For most countries this is clearly beyond the lifecycle of a single government. This implies that several governments would have to persevere with a common thread of reform efforts and incur related costs, while the benefits from improvements will accrue to future decision-makers” (p. 8).

**Evan S. Lieberman, Daniel N. Posner, and Lily L. Tsai (2013). Does Information Lead to More Active Citizenship?: Evidence from an Education Intervention in Rural Kenya.**

“In many cases, citizens in poor countries believe that service delivery is the government’s job, or that monitoring the government and applying pressure on it to improve the quality of the services it provides is the responsibility of local leaders, NGOs, professional inspectors, journalists or other individuals—but not themselves. To the extent that this is the case, the recognition that something needs to be done may not generate behavior by citizens to do something about it. Again, this perception may also be affected by other types of information campaigns, but on its own, information about service delivery failures is not likely to motivate citizens to act unless they perceive responsibility for holding government (or the service delivery unit in question—the school, the clinic, the bank, etc.) to account” (p. 31).

More information is not a panacea for the problems of low government accountability in poor democracies. Diagnostic information (i.e. assessments) does not necessarily spark citizen discontent or action, especially if that information is not perceived to be “new”, or clearly indicative of service delivery failure. Social and political contexts, including generalized perceptions of efficacy, are likely to matter a great deal…” (p. 38).

**Shantayanan Devarajan, Stuti Khemani, and Michael Walton (July, 2011). Civil Society, Public Action and Accountability in Africa. *Policy Research Working Paper 5733.* Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.**

“… large variation both within and across different information interventions to mobilize citizens to increase their client power suggests that local context and the larger political economy environment matter significantly for success, especially in supporting (or not) citizen engagement in strengthening compacts or authorized client-power structures with public providers” (p. 27).

**Stuti Khemani (January, 2013). Buying Votes Vs. Supplying Public Services: Political Incentives to Under-invest in Pro-poor Policies. *Policy Research Working Paper 6339*. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.**

“There are large knowledge gaps in how information about government performance in delivering health and education services might be packaged and disseminated to nudge voters to shift their expectations, and demand more from government. Simultaneously, there are gaps in understanding how such nudges to voters, on the demand-side of political accountability, might enable better quality, service-oriented candidates to emerge on the supply-side” (p. 25).

**Matt Andrews (2013). *The Limits of Institutional Reform in Development: Changing Rules for Realistic Solutions*. New York: Cambridge University Press.**

“… reforms may often be introduced as signals to improve short-term external perceptions of government effectiveness, with little focus on fostering better long-term results. The signaling game means that countries commit to best practice reforms but seldom succeed in implementing them (especially when contexts are prohibitive). The response to poor implementation is to resume signaling, often promising better versions of the same failed reforms, instead of asking how the prior intervention could be made more influential. Over time, countries get better at producing the externally visible forms associated with these promises, but a gap exists between form and function” (p. )